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The Extraterritoriality Formalisms
AARON D. SIMOWITZ
The extraterritorial application of U.S. law was a settled issue for a long time. For
about sixty years, U.S. law would apply abroad if conduct occurred or effects were felt
within U.S. borders. This potentially broad sweep of U.S. law was limited in several
ways—most importantly by the doctrine of “reasonableness” grounded in international
law and explicated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.
This approach had its detractors. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court joined the ranks
of the critics in dramatic fashion. The Court cast aside the previous sixty years of
jurisprudence—dismissing it as uninhibited “judicial lawmaking”—and created a new
test. This new approach proceeded in two parts. A court should ask whether the
“presumption against extraterritoriality”—a sometimes cited, but oft ignored concept—
was rebutted by a “clear indication” in the text or “context” of the statute. If not, a court
should then inquire whether the particular case presents a “domestic application” of the
statute. But merely “some domestic activity” would not constitute a domestic application
of the statute. Rather, the court must define the “objects of the statute’s solicitude” and
then determine whether that “focus” is within U.S. borders.
The Court presented this revolution as more predictable, less complex, and
more deferential to the legislature. In reality, the Court traded the venerable
uncertainties of the conduct-and-effects test for the new, poorly understood, and
unanticipated uncertainties of the “Morrison two-step.” Many commentators have
attempted to make sense of Morrison’s first step—the reinvigorated presumption
against extraterritoriality. But relatively few have examined Morrison’s second
step—the question of what it means for a statute to apply domestically in the context
of a transnational dispute. In fact, this second question—which the Morrison
opinion treats practically as a throw-away line—has caused far more divergence
and confusion among the lower courts. It has become a distorted reflection of the
extraterritoriality inquiry: the same consequences, but with irrelevant facts or
formalisms looming large in the picture. This article attempts to lay out both the
current myths and mistakes of the so-called “focus test” and to chart a sensible path
forward.
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The Extraterritoriality Formalisms
AARON D. SIMOWITZ *
INTRODUCTION
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court
discarded sixty years of jurisprudence governing whether U.S. law would
apply beyond U.S. borders.1 The Court did so in the name of predictability
and consistency. The actual results have largely been confusion and
divergence. However, the source of the greatest discord has largely been
overlooked, both by the Court and by commentators.
The Morrison Court spent the vast majority of its opinion on a single
project: reinvigorating the “presumption against extraterritoriality.”2 For
sixty years before Morrison, U.S. laws had applied abroad when either
conduct occurred or effects were felt in the United States. Potential
overreach was policed by several doctrines, most notably the application of
“reasonableness,” rooted in international law and delineated in the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.3
The Morrison Court attacked this approach, declaring it to be
uninhibited “judicial lawmaking,”4 with results “complex in formulation and
unpredictable in application.”5 The Court replaced this structure with the
presumption against extraterritoriality, which can be rebutted only when the
text or “context” of the statute contain a “clear indication” of extraterritorial
application.6 The presumption did not prove to be simple or predictable. In
*

Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law; Affiliated Scholar, The Classical
Liberal Institute at New York University School of Law. I owe great thanks to Linda Silberman, Pamela
Bookman, Bill Dodge, Symeon Symeonides, Jim Nafziger, Jeff Dobbins, Andrew Gilden, Norman
Williams, Karen Sandrik, Peter Molk, Warren Binford, Frank Gevurtz, Maggie Gardner and the
participants in the Northern California International Law Scholars Conference and in the Stanford Civil
Procedure Workshop. I am also indebted to my wife for her insights on the complexities of the crossborder swaps market.
1
561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“This disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality did not
originate with the Court of Appeals panel in this case. It has been repeated over many decades by various
courts of appeals in determining the application of the Exchange Act, and § 10(b) in particular, to
fraudulent schemes that involve conduct and effects abroad.”).
2
See id. at 255 (describing the presumption against extraterritoriality as “long and often recited in
our opinions”).
3
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 (1986)
(describing the conduct-and-effects test).
4
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261 (“The concurrence urges us to cast aside our inhibitions and join in the
judicial lawmaking.”).
5
Id. at 248.
6
See id. at 265.
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successive cases, the Court either failed to lay out a clear, consensus
approach to the analysis7 or made significant alterations to it.8
Even so, the main source of confusion has been left largely unaddressed.
Morrison set out a two-part test.9 The Court held that no clear indication
existed to rebut the presumption, and so inquired whether the present case
constituted a “domestic application” of the statute.10 The Morrison Court
expressly acknowledged the necessity of this inquiry, noting that when the
“presumption here (as often) is not self-evidently dispositive . . . its
application requires further analysis.”11 However, the Court cautioned that
“it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all
contact with the territory of the United States,” and that “the presumption
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it
retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the
case.”12
Rejecting this “timid sentinel,”13 the Court held that lower courts must
first determine “the objects of the statute’s solicitude,”14 and then find
whether that “focus of congressional concern” is “domestic.”15 The new
test—although the Court did nothing to acknowledge its novelty—came to
be known as “the focus test.”16 The Court presented the focus test as simple.
Perhaps it seemed so in context of the Morrison case itself. The Morrison
case was a classic “f-cubed” case—an action for securities fraud under the
7
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (“And even where the
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”).
8
See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016) (“We agree with the
Second Circuit that Congress’s incorporation of these (and other) extraterritorial predicates into RICO
gives a clear, affirmative indication that § 1962 applies to foreign racketeering activity—but only to the
extent that the predicates alleged in a particular case themselves apply extraterritorially.”).
9
See id. at 2101 (“Morrison and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for analyzing
extraterritoriality issues.”).
10
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (“Petitioners argue that the conclusion that § 10(b) does not apply
extraterritorially does not resolve this case. They contend that they seek no more than domestic
application anyway, since Florida is where HomeSide and its senior executives engaged in the deceptive
conduct of manipulating HomeSide’s financial models . . . .”).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 267.
15
Id. at 266 (“In Aramco, for example, the Title VII plaintiff had been hired in Houston, and was
an American citizen. The Court concluded, however, that neither that territorial event nor that
relationship was the ‘focus’ of congressional concern, but rather domestic employment.” (quoting EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991))).
16
See William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110 AM. J.
INT’L L. UNBOUND 45, 45–46 (2016) (detailing and analyzing the two-step test presented in RJR Nabisco,
where the second step of the test involves looking into the statute’s focus); Franklin A. Gevurtz,
Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM . & MARY L. REV. 341, 342 (2014) (“[I]f the focus of the statute
determines extraterritoriality, what is the test for determining the focus of the statute?”).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”) that sought redress for a foreign
plaintiff against a foreign defendant, based on public trading on a foreign
exchange.17 The focus test has proved to be truly “complex in formulation
and unpredictable in application”18 in other areas of law—and even in
securities law, the heartland of the Morrison opinion.
The focus test introduces two types of uncertainty. First, the focus test
creates statutory uncertainty. The Morrison test requires courts to identify
the statute’s focus—“the objects of the statute’s solicitude.”19 Perhaps this
was a simple question in the context of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Court seemed to have little trouble concluding that the focus of the Act
was the exchange itself.20 But this inquiry has become far more complicated
as the Court has expanded the Morrison test to other statutes—apparently,
to every other statute.21 For example, appellate courts split over the
Congress’s regulatory focus in the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), unable to decide whether this multifaceted
statute “focused” on corrupt enterprises or patterns of criminal conduct—as
the United States itself suggested—both.22 In the RJR Nabisco v. European
Community case, the Court declined to answer the question, but rather
emphasized the additional complication that each statutory subsection must
have its own individual focus.23
The second source of uncertainty is descriptive. Even once a court has
identified “the objects of a statute’s solicitude”—for example, the securities
transaction in Morrison—it may be quite difficult to say whether a particular
object is inside or outside the United States.24 Again, the Morrison Court did
not seem to foresee this complication.
The Morrison case concerned securities traded on a public exchange. It
17

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 283 n.11.
Id. at 248.
19
Id. at 267.
20
See id. (“The primacy of the domestic exchange is suggested by the very prologue of the
Exchange Act . . . .”).
21
See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (“Absent clearly
expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic
application . . . . We therefore apply the presumption across the board . . . .”).
22
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (No. 15-138), 2015 WL 9268185, at *9 (“Contrary to petitioners'
claim, RICO contains no domestic-enterprise requirement. RICO’s ‘focus’ is on the ‘pattern’ as well as
the enterprise. Accordingly, if a pattern of domestic racketeering activity occurs, RICO may be violated
whether the enterprise is foreign or domestic.” (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266)).
23
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106 (“The same logic requires that we separately apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality to RICO's cause of action despite our conclusion that the
presumption has been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibitions.”).
24
See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 326 (2015)
(“Territoriality, after all, depends on the ability to define the relevant ‘here’ and ‘there,’ and it presumes
that the ‘here’ and ‘there’ have normative significance. The ease and speed with which data travels across
borders . . . test[s] these foundational premises.”).
18

380

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2

is not difficult for a U.S. court to conclude that the New York Stock
Exchange is “domestic” and that the London Exchange is not. However, the
Court devoted a half-sentence to the entire subject to so-called off-exchange
transactions—securities transactions that do not take place on a public
exchange. From 2008 to 2014, the percentage of all U.S. stock traded
conducted off-exchange increased from sixteen to about forty percent.25 The
actual percentage of off-exchange transactions is likely much higher once
all non-equity securities transactions are included. In this much larger
category of securities transactions, the Court caused complete confusion.
Some have tied the application of U.S. securities law to empty territorial
proxies—such as the place of closing, the applicable law, or the identity of
the parties.26 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—
the federal appellate court most responsible for securities cases—rejected
these approaches and chose to tie U.S. regulation to “the place where
irrevocable liability is incurred.”27 This test quickly proved both
unpredictable and, in that court’s own admission, over-inclusive.28
Some cases have combined both statutory and descriptive uncertainty.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the Stored Communication Act’s regulatory focus was “the right to
privacy,” rejecting the litigants’ arguments that the focus was either the
place of the production of the data, or the server with which the data was

25
John McCrank, Dark Markets May Be More Harmful than High-Frequency Trading, REUTERS
(Apr. 6, 2014, 8:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dark-markets-analysis/dark-markets-maybe-more-harmful-than-high-frequency-trading-idUSBREA3508V20140406.
26
See, e.g., SEC v. Compania Internacional Financiera S.A., No. 11 CIV 4904 DLC, 2011 WL
3251813, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011) (applying Morrison and concluding that extraterritorial
application was warranted where foreign parties were conducting off-exchange trading of contracts for
difference on stock of an exchange-traded company because the underlying securities were associated
with a national exchange).
27
Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012).
28
The U.S. Supreme Court’s quest for uncertainty has confounded not only courts, but also
regulators. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is charged with promulgating rules
to govern the U.S. regulation of swap contracts. These are the very “swaps” that Warren Buffett described
as the “financial weapons of mass destruction” that turned the sub-prime mortgage crisis into a global
financial crisis. Lucinda Shen, Warren Buffett Just Unloaded $195 Million Worth of These 'Weapons of
Mass Destruction,' FORTUNE (Aug. 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/08/mass-destruction-buffettderivatives/. The landmark Dodd-Frank financial reform statute charged the CFTC with “exclusive
jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving swaps or contracts
of sale of a commodity for future delivery.” 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). After Morrison, the CFTC went through
multiple gyrations attempts to set out rule-based approaches to Dodd-Frank’s registration requirements.
Michael L. Spafford & Daren F. Stanaway, The Extraterritorial Reach of the Commodity Exchange Act
in the Wake of Morrison and Dodd-Frank, 37 J. ON L. INV. & RISK MGMT. PRODUCTS, July 2017, at 10
(“Although Congress declined to expand the extraterritorial reach of the CEA in the same manner in
which it amended the securities laws in Dodd-Frank, it did not leave the CFTC without recourse to pursue
foreign entities.”).
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29

principally associated. Other members of that court described this as “not
marginally more useful than thinking of Santa Claus as a denizen of the
North Pole,”30 and a severe restriction on “an essential investigative tool
used thousands of times a year [in] important criminal investigations around
the country.”31 To the relief of many, the legislature stepped in to resolve the
issue by statute after the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.32
This article seeks to address the statutory uncertainty created by
Morrison.33 The lower courts have committed a variety of errors in
attempting to wrestle with this new inquiry thrust on them by the U.S.
Supreme Court. These errors must be identified and addressed. The lower
courts have also so far failed to articulate a coherent or consistent approach
to the question of what constitutes “domestic application” of U.S. law in a
transnational dispute. This article seeks to do both, while recognizing that
the fundamentally transnational context in which the “domestic application”
inquiry arise.
Unless the “focus test” is remediated or discarded, the second step of
Morrison will be a warped and puzzling reflection of the extraterritoriality
inquiry. If a court concludes that a statute has been applied “domestically,”
that decision will have the exact same consequences for a dispute as the
conclusion that the law applies extraterritorially. But the “domestic
application” inquiry focuses on irrelevant facts and formalisms—like where
data is localized—while ignoring the weightier and more important question
of which sovereign is best situated to regulate the conduct at issue.
This article proceeds in four parts. First, the article will identify the ways
in which the development of the Morrison test led to the current discord.
Second, the article will examine the various and disparate bodies of law in
which the “focus test” has caused confusion and identify the particular
mistakes and myths that are common to each body of law. Third, the Article
identifies the unnecessary formalisms that have encrusted and distorted the
29
Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 217 (2d Cir. 2016). (“[W]e conclude that the relevant provisions of the SCA focus
on protecting the privacy of the content of a user's stored electronic communications.”), vacated as moot
sub nom. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
30
Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 855 F.3d 53, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“Localizing the data in Ireland is not
marginally more useful than thinking of Santa Claus as a denizen of the North Pole. Problems arise if
one over-thinks the problem, reifying the notional: Where in the world is a Bitcoin? Where in my DVR
are the images and voices? Where are the snows of yesteryear?”).
31
Id. at 63 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (“To top this off, the panel majority’s decision does not serve
any serious, legitimate, or substantial privacy interest.”).
32
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1187–88 (2018) (acknowledging the
mootness of the overseas data privacy question at issue after Congress passed the Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act) on March 23, 2018).
33
Each of these uncertainties—statutory and descriptive—merit their own paper. I plan to address
the descriptive uncertainty—where there is an off-exchange security transaction, a right to privacy, a
pattern of criminal conduct, or a fraudulent transaction—in future work.
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focus test. Fourth, the article lays out a new vision for how best to execute
the Supreme Court’s exhortation to determine the “domestic application” of
U.S. law in transnational disputes.
I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND DOMESTIC APPLICATION
The era of the conduct and effects test does not deserve to be
romanticized. The conduct and effects test attracted plenty of calls for
reform or demolition.34 However, after eighty years or so, its uncertainties
were more or less known.35 It is possible that, after another eighty years or
so, the Morrison version of the presumption will be regarded as an
improvement over the old regime. The Morrison presumption certainly
shows no signs of fading. Rather, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope
of the presumption in successive cases, even as its formulation has shifted
significantly with each iteration.36
A. The Old Regime – The Conduct and Effects Test
For several decades, the U.S. doctrine of extraterritoriality proceeded in
a more or less straight line. U.S. courts consistently held that they could
apply U.S. substantive law when either the relevant conduct took place in
34
See Austen L. Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1455, 1460–61 (2008) (“Condemned as incoherent and convoluted, a patchwork of incompatible rules
presently governs legislative jurisdiction. Some scholars go so far as to describe the Court's
extraterritoriality decisions as patently inconsistent, if not hopelessly confused.”); William S. Dodge,
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 90 (1998)
(“[O]nly the notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind is a legitimate
basis for the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . . [A]cts of Congress should presumptively apply
only to conduct that causes effects within the United States regardless of where that conduct occurs.”
(emphasis omitted)).
35
See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1673,
1674 (2012) (“To be sure, significant and vigorous debate existed at the margins over the extent to which
constitutional provisions constrained congressional action and over how courts should interpret a statute's
geographic reach in the face of congressional silence. But while those debates played out at the periphery,
the core doctrine remained untouched.”); Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to A Flame? International
Securities Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court's “Transactional Test,” 52 VA. J.
INT’L L. 405, 422 (2012) (“[N]otwithstanding the undeniable problems accompanying the conducteffects test, [it did not pose] a significant threat in terms of excessive extension of American jurisprudence
that was in conflict with the sovereignty of other jurisdictions . . . [and was not] a strain on American
courts that were called on to resolve primarily foreign disputes.”).
36
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013) (applying the Morrison
presumption to the Alien Tort Statute, even though that statute is “strictly jurisdictional,” and “does not
directly regulate conduct or afford relief” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004));
id. at 124–25 (“And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must
do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”); RJR
Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (noting that the Court applies the
Morrison presumption “across the board”); id. at 2103 (“This unique structure makes RICO the rare
statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of
extraterritoriality.”).

2019]

THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY FORMALISMS

383

the U.S. or the effects were felt here.
The notion of a presumption against extraterritoriality did not originate
with the Morrison Court. But Morrison revived the old concept and
transformed it into something new and distinct from its previous
incarnations. The presumption against extraterritoriality as a concept in
American law dates back at least to 1824 when Justice Story applied it to
limit the reach of U.S. customs laws.37 Justice Holmes delivered perhaps
“the most famous modern statement of the presumption against
extraterritoriality”38 in American Banana v. United Fruit, in which he noted
“the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the
act is done,” requiring “a construction of any statute as intended to be
confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”39
“However, the influence of the presumption soon began to wane.”40
Although the U.S. Supreme Court occasionally cited the principle in labor
law cases,41 it all but ignored it in antitrust cases.42 Judge Learned Hand gave
the most famous formulation of the “effects” test in United States v. Alcoa,
where he wrote that “any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states
will ordinarily recognize.”43 Judge Henry Friendly gave the most famous
formulation of the “conduct” test in Leasco Data v. Maxwell, where he wrote
that when “there has been significant conduct within the territory, a statute
cannot properly be held inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent the
clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have meant to go beyond
the limits recognized by foreign relations law.”44
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law sought to sum up the
U.S. approach: A state had a reasonable basis to apply its own law to
“conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory,”45
37

See The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) (“The laws of no nation can justly extend
beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the
sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction.”).
38
Dodge, supra note 34, at 85.
39
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1909).
40
Dodge, supra note 34, at 85.
41
See, e.g., Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949) (reasoning that Congress
intended to apply domestic labor laws only to domestic workers); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S.
29, 31 (1925) (noting that Federal Employers’ Liability Act does not have extraterritorial force).
42
See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275–76 (1927) (making no mention
of the presumption); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283–87 (1952) (declining to rigorously
apply the presumption to the Lanham Act).
43
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
44
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
45
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).

384

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2

or “conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory.”46 However, this principle had limits. The
Restatement provided that, even if a state had a reasonable basis to apply its
law, “a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable” and laid out non-exhaustive factors for
evaluating unreasonableness.47 The Restatement concluded that “[w]hen it
would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over
a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict,
each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state’s
interest in exercising jurisdiction,” and that “a state should defer to the other
state if that state’s interest is clearly greater.”48
B. The New Old Extraterritoriality – The Presumption
In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed poised to significantly alter the
reach of U.S. law. In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), the
Court held that federal anti-discrimination law did not apply to a claim made
by a U.S. national against a U.S. corporation because the discriminatory
conduct had occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.49 The Court invoked
the “presumption against extraterritoriality,” which it defined as the
principle that a U.S. statue must be presumed to be “primarily concerned
with domestic conditions”, unless Congress has “clearly expressed” its
“affirmative intention” that the law should apply extraterritorially.50 Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, dissented, arguing that
the majority “converts the presumption against extraterritoriality into a
clear-statement rule in part through selective quotation,” and “also
overstates the strength of the presumption by drawing on language from
cases involving a wholly independent rule of construction,” the so-called
Charming Betsy canon, that “an act of congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”51
46

Id. § 402(1)(c). In addition to these bases for prescriptive jurisdiction, the Restatement also
provided for so-called “passive personality” and “special . . . interests” jurisdiction. Id. § 402 cmt. g
(introducing the “passive personality principle”); id. § 402 cmt. a (applying the “special . . . interests”
jurisdiction to subsection (c)). See also id. § 402(2)–(3) (“[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to . . . (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its
territory; and (3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against
the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.”).
47
Id. § 403(1)–(2).
48
Id. § 403(3).
49
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 244, 248 (1991) (holding that Congress
did not “intend[] the protections of Title VII to apply to United States citizens employed by American
employers outside of the United States”).
50
Id. at 248 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
51
Id. at 260, 263–64 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963)); see also Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353
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The Aramco decision landed with a profound thud. Congress overturned
the result with amendments to the relevant antidiscrimination law. 52 The
U.S. Supreme Court cited to the principle in a few subsequent cases.53 Two
years later, in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, the Court applied the
conduct-and-effects test to the U.S. antitrust law, proceeding almost as if
Aramco had never been decided.54 The majority declined even to cite to
Aramco. But although the presumption against extraterritoriality seemed
dead, it “did but slumber.”55
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court took up the presumption again in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank. The Court decided a legal issue of
profound transnational significance in the context of particularly skewed
facts (and not for the last time).56 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
described the conduct-and-effects test as “judicial-speculation-made-law—
divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation
before the court,”57 and the results as “unpredictable and inconsistent.”58 He
revived the presumption, stating that, “[r]ather than guess anew in each case,
we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”59
Justices Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg.60 In the face of
these critiques, Justice Scalia sought to qualify the presumption, stating that
it was not a “clear statement rule”, but rather required only a “clear

U.S. 138, 146–147 (1957) (refusing to “run interference in . . . [the] delicate field of international
relations” without express intent from Congress to do so).
52
Congress amended the definitions of Title VII to include U.S. citizens working overseas. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)) (“With respect to
employment in a foreign country, [the] term [employee] includes an individual who is a citizen of the
United States.”).
53
See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203–04 (1993) (noting the “longstanding principle”
that laws should only apply within the “territorial jurisdiction of the United States” (citation omitted));
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1993) (“Acts of Congress do not ordinarily
apply outside our borders.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585–89 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (discussing Congressional intent in applying legislation to domestic activities only); see also
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440–41 (1989) (“[L]egislation of
Congress . . . is meant to only apply within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” (citation
omitted)).
54
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (“[I]t is well established by now
that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States.”).
55
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, act 2, sc. 6.
56
See Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1098 (2015) (“In two
recent cases involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign conduct (known as ‘foreigncubed’ cases), however, the Court solidified its retreat to territoriality.” (footnote omitted)).
57
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
58
Id. at 260–61.
59
Id. at 261.
60
Id. at 274.
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indication of extraterritoriality.” The Court declined to give examples of
such indications or to make clear how such an indication would differ from
a clear statement, except to state that “[a]ssuredly context can be
consulted.”62
Morrison left open a great many questions, including whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality applied to all statutes—a particular
puzzle given that Court’s failure in Morrison to address its prior decision
Hartford Fire. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Court seemed to
answer that question with a resounding yes.63 In Kiobel, the Court held that
the Morrison presumption applied to the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).64 The
ATS is a transnational law mystery. The U.S. Congress enacted it in 1789,
stating in full: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States.”65 Debates continue as to what this was
originally designed to address66 and as to what work it can do today.67
Nonetheless, the ATS is clearly different from the securities law at issue
in Morrison. The ATS addresses transnational issues—it allows U.S. courts
to entertain causes of action only for “an alien” and only for a tort “in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”68 The ATS
is also, in part, a jurisdictional statute: It vests district courts with original
jurisdiction over a certain class of disputes.69
The Court did not see Morrison and Kiobel as different, simply
extending the “principles underlying the presumption against
61
See id. at 265 (“But we do not say, as the concurrence seems to think, that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is a ‘clear statement rule’. . . .”).
62
Id.
63
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013) (“[W]e think the principles
underlying the [presumption against extraterritoriality] similarly constrain courts considering causes of
action that may be brought under the ATS.”).
64
Id. at 116.
65
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
66
See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 830, 836 (2006) (“The statute was not enacted to redress piracy or infringements of ambassadorial
rights. Safe conducts have been almost entirely neglected in the literature . . . .”).
67
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational
Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1051 (2015) (stating that federal courts, under
the ATS, have jurisdiction over cases regarding genocide, war crimes, and torture); Roger P. Alford, The
Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1751–52 (2014)
(arguing that “foreign tort laws will apply to the typical human rights claims that were pursued under the
ATS” and that relief under ATS will likely not apply to “foreign human rights victims”).
68
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
69
See Pamela K. Bookman, Agora: Reflections on RJR Nabisco v. European Community Doubling
Down on Litigation Isolationism, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 57, 58 (2016) (noting that, prior to the
Court’s RJR Nabisco decision, “Kiobel might have been an outlier because the purely jurisdictional
statute at issue was the extraordinary Alien Tort Statute, and the Court made this extension in large part
because the Court had previously held that the Alien Tort Statute permitted the courts to create a cause
of action” (footnote omitted)).

2019]

THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY FORMALISMS

387

extraterritoriality” to constrain “courts exercising their power under the
ATS.”70 However, the Court failed to articulate a clear rule for the
application of the Morrison presumption to the ATS. The Court affirmed
that the ATS was not wholly an empty “shelf”71—but that “even where the
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”72 The Court declined to give any guidance as to what sorts of
claims would meet this test, except to say that mere “corporate presence” of
a defendant was not enough.73 The Court also declined to explain how
Morrison’s pure “canon of statutory interpretation”74 could be “displaced”
by a particular constellation of facts.75
In RJR Nabisco v. European Community, the Court’s next decision on
the presumption, the Court held that a statute may contain “a clear,
affirmative indication” that it applies extraterritorially, and yet apply
extraterritorially “only to the extent that the predicates alleged in a particular
case themselves apply extraterritorially.”76 In RJR Nabisco, the European
Community prevailed on the issue that had consumed the lower courts’
attention—whether the Morrison presumption cabined RICO’s
application.77 But it still lost. The manner of its defeat illustrates an
important point about Morrison and its application. The presumption against
extraterritoriality—the main issue in Morrison and the preoccupation of
scholars and lower courts attempting to interpret Morrison—did not decide
the case. Rather, it was the so-called “focus test” that scuttled the European
Community’s suit.78
70

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013).
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719 (2004) (“[T]he First Congress did not pass the
ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state
legislature that might, someday, authorize the creation of causes of action . . . .”).
72
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25.
73
See id. at 125 (“Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to
say that mere corporate presence suffices.”).
74
Id. at 115.
75
Id. at 131.
76
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016).
77
Id. at 2093.
78
Id. at 2111 (“Section 1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury
to business or property and does not allow recovery for foreign injuries.”). The Court’s most recent
extraterritoriality decision, WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical, also places the focus test front-and-center.
138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018). The Court in RJR Nabisco noted in dicta that, some instances, in might be
appropriate for a court to analyze the “focus test” before considering whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality had been rebutted. See 136 S.Ct., at 2101, n. 5. The Court in WesterGeco did exactly
that, noting that “addressing step one would require resolving ‘difficult questions’ that do not change
‘the outcome of the case,’ but could have far-reaching effects in future cases. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct.
2129 at 2136 (quoting RJR Nabisco, 555 U.S. at 236–237)). The Court declined to consider whether the
“presumption against extraterritoriality should never apply to statutes . . . that merely provide a general
damages remedy for conduct that Congress has declared unlawful. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136.
Rather, the Court proceeded directly to consider the focus of the remedial portion of the Patent Act. The
71
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C. Extraterritoriality’s Distorted Reflection – The Focus Test
Morrison resurrected the presumption against extraterritoriality—
sometimes called “Morrison Step-One.”79 But Morrison also introduced a
new “Step-Two.” The Morrison Court instructed lower courts to, first,
determine whether a “clear, affirmative indication” rebutted the presumption
against extraterritoriality, and if not, to determine whether the particular
facts of the case presented a “domestic application” of the statute.80
To answer the question of what constituted a “domestic application,” the
Court adopted the “rather simplistic ‘focus’ test.”81 Justice Scalia directed
the lower courts to look to the “object of the statute’s solicitude.”82 It would
not be sufficient that the case merely “had some domestic contact”—for the
Morrison presumption “would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated
into its kennel” at the threat of merely some domestic connections.83
Therefore, the second step of Morrison would actually require two
analytical steps. First, a court would be required to assess the “objects of the
statute’s solicitude”—to state what precisely a statute is about.84 Second, the
court would make a factual determination as to whether the particular
“objects” in the instant case were within the territorial boundaries on the
United States or not. The Morrison Court introduced this test with little
explanation, most likely under the impression that these were simple
questions. In fact, Morrison’s focus test has introduced two types of
uncertainty, statutory uncertainty and descriptive uncertainty. Because of the
particular context of Morrison, the Court viewed both inquiries as simple.
Neither has proved to be.
The Morrison case concerned publicly traded securities—equities
bought and sold on public, regulated exchanges. The Court held that “it is in
our view only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and
domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”85 In
other words, the Court held that the “focus” of the Securities Exchanges Act
of 1934, section 10(b) was the regulation of the proper functioning of the
majority and dissent disagreed, without evident irony, about what “focus” was dictated by the “plain
text” of the statute.
79
See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (“Morrison and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for
analyzing extraterritoriality issues. At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that
it applies extraterritorially.”).
80
See id. (“If the statute is not extraterritorial, then at the second step we determine whether the
case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’”).
81
Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring), vacated as moot sub nom. U.S. v.
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
82
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
83
Id. at 266.
84
Id. at 267.
85
Id.
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exchange itself. This was not necessarily an obvious conclusion—
plaintiffs argued that the injuries to defrauded parties should at least also be
a “focus”87—but it was not especially difficult either. The Court prominently
cited the work of Linda Silberman and Stephen Choi arguing that the
exchange was the right object of “the statute’s solicitude” for purposes of
both conflicts of law and deterring securities fraud.88
Because the Court viewed this as a readily apparent conclusion, it gave
little assistance to lower courts in this new search for the “objects of the
statute’s solicitude.” The Court said only the mere presence of some
domestic contacts could not suffice, though that was in the context of
justifying the invention of the focus test itself.89 Lower courts interpreted
Justice Scalia’s pungent dicta to require that they avoid any application of
the focus test that would recapitulate the “conduct and effects” test—in other
words, holding that the focuses of a statutes were both the relevant conduct
and the resulting effects.90 But the Court did not lay down any interpretive
guideposts, neglecting to say whether this inquiry should be particularly
transnational nature. In short, it seemed pretty easy to the Court: Just say
what the statute is about.
II. DOMESTIC APPLICATION DISHARMONY
The Court’s “rather simplistic”91 formulation of the focus test led
immediately to confusion in and among the lower courts. Even in securities
law—the subject of the Morrison opinion itself—the focus test has divided
and perplexed the courts.
A. The Domestic Off-exchange Transaction
Post-Morrison securities cases demonstrate that, even where the U.S.
Supreme Court has specified the statutory focus, significant problems
remain. In Morrison, the Court held that, when the alleged fraud concerns
exchange-traded securities, the object of U.S. regulatory law is the exchange
86

Id. at 266–67.
See id. at 266 (articulating plaintiff’s argument that just because “§10(b) does not apply
extraterritorially does not resolve the case.”).
88
Id. at 260 (citing Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global
Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 468 (2009)).
89
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (“But the presumption against extraterritorial application would
be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in
the case.”).
90
See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting
that the conduct and effects test is defunct and applying a “transactional test” from Morrison that does
not involve conduct nor effects).
91
Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring), vacated as moot sub nom. U.S. v.
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
87
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itself. However, the significant majority of all securities transactions do
not occur on public exchanges—but are rather so-called “off-exchange
transactions,” including all transactions in privately held entities. The Court
consigned this entire category of transactions to a six word aside: “And it is
in our view only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and
domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”93
The lower courts immediately splintered on the question of how to
determine whether these “off-exchange” transactions were “domestic.”
Modern securities transactions very rarely take place in person—the “place
of closing” is an anachronism—but are rather negotiated, drafted, and signed
over e-mail and by PDF. Litigants looked to numerous territorial proxies94
in their attempts to localize these transactions, including the place of the
broker-dealer, the closing, the parties, or the issuer.95 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an off-exchange
transaction is located where “irrevocable liability was incurred or title was
transferred,”96 and emphasized that the “transactional test announced in
Morrison does not require” conduct in the United States.97
Two years later, the court retreated from this conclusion, holding that
“while a domestic transaction or listing is necessary to state a claim under §
10(b), a finding that these transactions were domestic would not suffice to
compel the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ invocation of § 10(b) was
appropriately domestic.”98 The court’s test had not been a model of clarity
before and now the one clear element of its holding—that conduct was
irrelevant—was withdrawn. These off-exchange transaction cases illustrate
92
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (indicating that the focus of the Exchange Act is the “purchase
and sales of securities in the United States”).
93
Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
94
Chris Brummer, Territoriality As A Regulatory Technique: Notes from the Financial Crisis, 79
U. CIN. L. REV. 499, 502 (2010) (“Defining geographic borders for regulatory purposes is not always a
straightforward matter. Instead, jurisdiction over financial matters often arises through what can be
described as territorial proxies.”)
95
See Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 68 (rejecting plaintiffs’ suggestion that “the location of the
broker-dealer should be used to locate securities transactions [because] [w]hile we agree that the location
of the broker could be relevant to the extent that the broker carries out tasks that irrevocably bind the
parties to buy or sell securities, the location of the broker alone does not necessarily demonstrate where
a contract was executed.”). The court also rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that “the identity of the securities
should be used to determine whether a securities transaction is domestic and that where, as in this case,
the securities are issued by United States companies and are registered with the SEC, the transactions are
domestic within the meaning of Morrison.” Id. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ argument was
“belied by the wording of the test announced in Morrison” which emphasized “domestic transactions in
other securities” and not other transactions in domestic securities. Id. at 68–69 (citation omitted).
96
Id. at 69 (“Accordingly, rather than looking to the identity of the parties, the type of security at
issue, or whether each individual defendant engaged in conduct within the United States, we hold that a
securities transaction is domestic when the parties incur irrevocable liability to carry out the transaction
within the United States or when title is passed within the United States.”).
97
Id.
98
Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 216 (2d Cir. 2014).
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that a “regulatory focus” may appear workable in one application—but
impossibly complex in others.
B. The Domestic Racketeering Enterprise
The RICO litigation in European Community illustrates both the
statutory and descriptive uncertainty introduced by Morrison. RICO
requires a “pattern of racketeering activity” by a criminal “enterprise” as
elements of the independent cause of action created by the statute.99 The
lower courts remain split on whether the “regulatory focus” of the statute is
the pattern or the enterprise. The answer, of course, is both.100 The United
States government argued as much in its amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme
Court in the European Community case.101 However, the Court’s holding did
not require it to reach the issue, as it held that RICO’s substantive provision
did, in some instances, apply extraterritorially.102
Nonetheless, the Court did pause to criticize the theory that the
“enterprise” constituted the RICO statute’s regulatory focus. 103 First, the
Court noted that selecting the criminal “enterprise” would present
predictable problems of localizing a diffuse and intangible “focus.”104
Second, the Court noted that, even if a predictable means to locate the
“enterprise” were devised, it would be too easy for racketeers to avoid RICO
by moving their “enterprise” abroad.105 This would undermine the very
purposes of the statute by permitting foreign racketeering to engage in
conduct with the United States without the threat of the most applicable U.S.
99

RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2096–97 (2016).
Compare United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
appropriate “focus” of the RICO statute is the pattern of racketeering activity), with Cedeno v. Intech
Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd sub nom. Cedeno v. Castillo, 457 F. App’x
35 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the appropriate “focus” of the RICO statute is the criminal “enterprise”).
101
See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur at 9, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), at *9 (“Contrary to petitioners’ claim, RICO contains no domesticenterprise requirement. RICO’s ‘focus’ is on the ‘pattern’ as well as the enterprise. Accordingly, if a
pattern of domestic racketeering activity occurs, RICO may be violated whether the enterprise is foreign
or domestic.” (internal citation omitted)).
102
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102–03 (2016) (holding that RICO may apply extraterritorially). As
described below, the Court held that the focus of RICO’s private right of action provision is the injury
sustained from the racketeering activity. See infra Section III(A) (discussing the RJR Nabisco holding).
103
The Court further noted that the statutory “indication” of extraterritoriality need not be found in
the portion of the statute that concerns its focus. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103 (2016) (“This
argument misunderstands Morrison . . . . [O]nly at the second step of the inquiry do we consider a
statute’s ‘focus.’ Here, however, there is a clear indication at step one that RICO applies extraterritorially.
We therefore do not proceed to the ‘focus’ step.”).
104
See id. at 2104 (“It is easy to see why Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enterprises. A
domestic enterprise requirement would lead to difficult line-drawing problems and counterintuitive
results . . . . RJR also offers no satisfactory way of determining whether an enterprise is foreign or
domestic.”).
105
Id. (“It would exclude from RICO’s reach foreign enterprises—whether corporations, crime
rings, other associations, or individuals—that operate within the United States.”).
100
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C. The Domestic Fraudulent Conveyance
Currently, the central issue on the ongoing Madoff receivership is
whether the Trustee for the defunct Madoff brokerage can claw back
payments made to foreign investors as part of the Madoff Ponzi scheme.
These foreign investors typically made their investment in the Madoff
brokerage though foreign “feeder funds,” themselves Cayman or British
Virgin Islands entities.107 These investors were then paid through the foreign
feeder funds.108 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recently held that the clawback provision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code could
reach these transactions because of the “focus” of the statute was
domestic.109
Section 550 of the Code empowers the Trustee to clawback any funds
fraudulently transferred that would have constituted “the property of the
estate,”110 defined to include property “wherever located and by whomever
held . . . .”111 This statutory language may well constitute a “clear indication”
that the Morrison presumption is rebutted, particularly in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s holding in RJR Nabisco that statutory language
incorporated by reference can meet this bar.112 But if it does not—as the

106
Id. (“Congress, after all, does not usually exempt foreigners acting in the United States from
U.S. legal requirements.”); see also European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir.
2014) (“Surely the presumption against extraterritorial application of United States laws does not
command giving foreigners carte blanche to violate the laws of the United States in the United States.”),
rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
107
Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 513 B.R. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
108
Id.
109
See Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Nos. 08-01789 (SMB), 11-02760
(SMB), 2017 WL 3084395, at *2–3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2017) (order withdrawing May 4, 2017
memorandum decision denying request to certify judgment for direct appeal to the Second Circuit).
110
See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2) (2012) (“[T]he trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property.”).
111
Id. § 541(a) (2012).
112
Other Courts of Appeals have so held. See, e.g., In re French, 440 F.3d 145, 152 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“Congress thus demonstrated an affirmative intention to allow avoidance of transfers of foreign property
that, but for a fraudulent transfer, would have been property of the debtor's estate. Therefore, the
presumption against extraterritoriality does not prevent application of § 548 here.”). In the Madoff
litigation, law professors (including this one) have supported such a result. See Brief of Professors of
Conflict of Laws as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 17, In re: Picard, No. 17-2992 (2d Cir.
2018), 2018 WL 564701 (“Section 550(a) [c]ontains a [c]lear [i]ndication of [e]xtraterritoriality.”). But
see Michael J. Colarossi, An Uncertain Future: The Questionable Extraterritoriality of the Bankruptcy
Code's Core Pre-Petition Avoidance Provisions, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229, 272–73 (2017)
(“Irrespective of whether Congress actually intended the avoidance provisions to apply extraterritorially,
the Supreme Court seems fully committed to barring such application absent an unmistakable instruction
of Congress’ pro-extraterritorial intent.”).

2019]

THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY FORMALISMS

393

113

lower court held —the question of the “regulatory focus” of section 550 of
the Code is placed squarely before the courts.
The Trustee argued before the lower courts that the proper regulatory
focus of section 550 of the Code is the estate itself. The district court held
that the regulatory focus is the ultimate transaction—the final transfer from
the foreign feeder fund to the foreign investor.114 In another case, the same
S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Judge as in the Madoff case held that the regulatory
focus is the initial transfer that depletes the estate—in other words, the
transfer from the Madoff brokerage to the foreign feeder funds (opening a
split within the S.D.N.Y.).115 The United State Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that it had overlooked the
necessary link between the Code’s substantive avoidance provisions and the
recovery provision embodied in section 550.116 Doing so, the appellate court
held that the focus of section 550 was the initial transfer that depletes the
estate.117
The Code is clearly concerned with the estate, transfers that deplete the
estate, and the liability of transferees. Section 550 itself speaks to all three
elements, “the benefit of the estate,” “the property transferred,” and in the
title of the section “Liability of transferee of avoided transfer.”118 The
appellate court and the district court each supposed that a plain text reading
of the Code clearly supplied any answer to the focus inquiry, but the
vigorous disagreement of judges and commentators belies this supposed

113
See Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS), 480 B.R. 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding
that the focus of the section 550 of the Code was the initial transfer and that the Morrison presumption
was rebutted by the language of the statute (Lifland, J.)), Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. BLMIS (In re
BLMIS), 513 B.R. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) supplemented by 12-MC-115, 2014 WL 3778155 (S.D.N.Y.
July 28, 2014) (holding that the focus of the section 550 of the Code was the ultimate transfer and that
the Morrison presumption was not rebutted by the language of the statute (Rakoff, J.)), on remand Sec.
Inv'r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. AP 08-01789 (SMB), 2016 WL 6900689, at
*1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016) (“I do not write on a clean slate.” (Bernstein, J.), vacated and
remanded sub nom. In re Picard, Tr. for Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 917 F.3d 85
(2d Cir. 2019) (holding that the focus of Section 550 is the initial transfer), Weisfelner v. Blavatnik, (In
re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 543 B.R. 127 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that the fraudulent transfer
provision of the Code did apply extraterritorially (Gerber, J.)), In re Ampal-Am. Israel Corp., 562 B.R.
601, 613 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that the focus of the Code’s fraudulent transfer provision is
the initial transfer and that the Morrison presumption is not rebutted (Bernstein, J.)). See also Edward R.
Morrison, Extraterritorial Avoidance Actions: Lessons From Madoff, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
268, 271 (Fall 2014).
114
Id. at 228.
115
See In re Ampal-Am. Israel Corp., 562 B.R. 601, 613 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017), BLI, 480 B.R. at
524; see also supra at note 113.
116
In re Picard, Tr. for Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 17-2992(L), 2019 WL
903978, at *8 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2019) (“The Appellees would have us ignore § 548(a)(1)(A) entirely and
look only to § 550(a)(2).”)
117
See id.
118
11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012).
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clarity. Plainly, further tools are needed to either supplement this analysis
or, better still, to recognize the fictive nature of any attempt to divine a single
focus from a complicated regulatory regime.
D. The Domestic Right to Privacy
U.S. prosecutors requested a “warrant”120 under the Stored
Communications Protection Act (SCPA) to obtain e-mail data relevant to a
drug conspiracy prosecution. The data was under the control of Microsoft,
which stated that it was principally associated with one of its servers in
Dublin, Ireland.121 All parties agreed that the procedure provided for in the
SCPA did not apply extraterritorially.122 The question of whether the
prosecutors could obtain the information therefore turned on whether the
“objects of the statute’s solicitude” were domestic or not.123
Microsoft argued that the regulatory focus of the SCPA was the data
itself, which was “located” in Dublin at the servers with which the data is
principally associated.124 The U.S. prosecutors argued that the focus was
production of documents125—and the “place of production” would be a
terminal located at Microsoft’s offices in the U.S. where a Microsoft
employee would be directed to access the data. The United State Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held the the focus was “the invasion of
privacy.”126 The court located this “invasion” at the place of the Irish
servers.127
The court’s decision was swiftly criticized by other courts, which did
not follow it.128 It was also attacked by other members of the same court,
119

See supra, at note 113.
See Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The Warrant directed Microsoft to seize and produce
the contents of an e-mail account that it maintains for a customer who uses the company's electronic
communications services . . . . The [w]arrant was then served on Microsoft at its headquarters in
Redmond, Washington.”), vacated as moot sub nom. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). In
addition to issues discussed in this paper, there has been significant disagreement as to the nature of this
authority at all, as it seems to partake of both the warrant and the subpoena procedures. See, e.g.,
Grimmelmann, infra note 133 (discussing the warrant authority under the Stored Communications Act).
121
Microsoft Warrant, 829 F.3d at 204.
122
Id. at 209.
123
Id. at 216.
124
Id. at 204.
125
See id. at 228 (Lynch, J., concurring) (“The government quite reasonably argues that the focus .
. . [is] on the place where the service provider discloses the information to the government, as
requested.”).
126
Id. at 220.
127
Id.
128
See In re Search Warrant No. 16–960–M–01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 719 (E.D. Pa.
2017) (“In contrast to the decision in Microsoft, this court holds that the disclosure by Google of the
electronic data relevant to the warrants at issue here constitutes neither a ‘seizure’ nor a ‘search’ of the
targets’; [sic] data in a foreign country.”).
120
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who argued in several separate dissents from denial of rehearing en banc,
that it was “not marginally more useful than thinking of Santa Claus as a
denizen of the North Pole,”129 and a severe restriction on “an essential
investigative tool used thousands of times a year [in] important criminal
investigations around the country.”130 A recent online symposium on the
Microsoft case featured scholars of criminal procedure, civil procedure,
conflict of laws, intellectual property, and information technology—none
endorsed the appellate court’s holding.131 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari.132 Though, as one scholar put it, when “I realized that the Supreme
Court had granted certiorari in an electronic evidence case that turned on
extraterritoriality, I buried my head in my hands.”133
This despair turned to be premature thanks to an unlikely hero: The
United States Congress. On March 23, 2018, Congress passed and the
President signed (as part of the omnibus spending bill) the Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act of 2018.134 The CLOUD Act mooted
the litigation on the reach of the SCA by specifying that an order under the
SCA applies to all data that is in the “possession, custody, or control” of the
provider, regardless of where that data is stored.135 The bill thus “rejects any
distinction between data stored in the United States and data stored abroad,”
and instead “lists eight factors courts must consider when deciding whether
to quash a demand for stored data that might set up a conflict between United
States and foreign law, including the customer’s location and nationality, the
provider’s ties to the United States, and the availability of alternative
means.”136 The bill also contains a mechanism to “pave the way for
executive agreements . . . to allow foreign governments to request content
directly from American providers.”137
129
Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 855 F.3d 53, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“Localizing the data in Ireland is not
marginally more useful than thinking of Santa Claus as a denizen of the North Pole. Problems arise if
one over-thinks the problem, reifying the notional: Where in the world is a Bitcoin? Where in my DVR
are the images and voices? Where are the snows of yesteryear?”).
130
Id. at 63 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“To top this off, the panel
majority’s decision does not serve any serious, legitimate, or substantial privacy interest.”).
131
Andrew Pincus et al., Special Feature: Symposium Before the Oral Argument in United States
v. Microsoft, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 9, 2018, 2:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/category/specialfeatures/symposium-before-the-oral-argument-in-united-states-v-microsoft/.
132
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (granting petition for a writ of certiorari).
133
James Grimmelmann, The Parties in U.S. v. Microsoft Are Misinterpreting the Stored
SECURITY
(Feb.
15,
2018),
Communications
Act’s
Warrant
Authority,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/52429/parties-u-s-v-microsoft-misinterpret-sca-warrant-authority/.
134
18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2012).
135
Andrew Keane Woods & Peter Swire, The CLOUD Act: A Welcome Legislative Fix for CrossBorder Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/cloud-act-welcomelegislative-fix-cross-border-data-problems.
136
Grimmelmann, supra note 133.
137
Woods & Swire, supra note 135.
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Justice Scalia might have defended this legislative intervention as the
sort of reaction by democratically accountable elected officials that he
celebrated. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, as the Court has pushed ever
more toward territorially-bounded approaches, the legislature has moved
away. After Aramco, after Morrison, and after Microsoft, the legislature
overturned these decisions, in part or in whole, by shifting the focus away
from simple territorial location.138 Initiatives by other legislatures have taken
a similar approach. And yet, the U.S. Supreme Court seems determined to
march further down the path of territorial formalism.
There may be many reasons for courts to institute a particular canon or
presumption, including that it avoids clashes with international law or
reflects concerns of international comity. Indeed, these were justifications
for earlier versions of the presumption.139 However, Justice Scalia justified
the Morrison revolution on the basis that it was descriptively accurate. He
noted that the presumption reflected the assumption that Congress is
“primarily concerned with domestic conditions.”140 If the new presumption
were not descriptively accurate, it would have been far more difficult to
justify such a dramatic change to the allegedly “stable background against
which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”141
If the presumption was intended to be a stable background, it has elicited
a sustained preference. Congress may be principally concerned with
“domestic conditions,” but each time it has legislated in the face the
presumption’s application, it has registered a desire to move away the
formalisms imposed by the new test.
III. THE FOCUS FORMALISMS
In Morrison, the focus test was “rather simplistic”142—but that
simplicity could have led to flexibility in application.143 Instead, the further
iterations of Morrison’s second step have encrusted it with formalisms, like
so many barnacles. In some instances, these formalisms have come from the
Supreme Court itself. In others, they seem to have congealed in the lower
138

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa, 80b-14 (2012) (shifting extraterritorial jurisdiction).
See William S. Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, __ HARV. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 9) (noting that “over time, the presumption against extraterritoriality
has changed significantly,” and has evolved “from a rule based on international law, to a canon of comity,
to an approach for determining legislative intent”).
140
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (quoting Aramco, 111 S.Ct. 1227).
141
Id. at 261. See Dodge, supra note 139, manuscript at Section III (analyzing Morrison as a change
to the presumption against extraterritoriality canon of interpretation).
142
Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring), vacated as moot sub nom. U.S. v.
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
143
See Dodge, supra note 139, manuscript at 7 (“I argue that academic criticisms of the new
presumption are misguided. The Morrison/RJR version of the presumption is significantly more flexible
than its Aramco and American Banana predecessors, and thus decidedly better.”).
139
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courts for no articulable reason. As we approach Morrison’s ten-year
anniversary, the focus test resembles a mutant purposivisim. Lower courts
attempt to locate the statute’s principal aim—but do so through the lens of
formalist restrictions that privilege irrelevant facts, impose interpretative
hurdles, and force bizarre conclusions.
A. The Atomized Focus
The RJR Nabisco majority itself added one of these barnacles. The RJR
Nabisco majority endorsed the argument that the private right of action
provision of RICO, § 1964(c), had to itself have a “regulatory focus.”144 Both
the decision below and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argued that it made no
sense to layer requirements upon requirements when, as the Supreme Court
had previously held, “the compensable injury addressed by § 1964(c)
necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to
constitute a pattern.”145 The majority overruled the lower court,146 relying
principally on amicus briefs filed thirteen years earlier in a different case by
Germany and the United Kingdom.147 The majority compounded the scope
of the Morrison presumption—applying it to all federal statutes—with a
blatant legal fiction—that Congress legislates with a particularly “regulatory
focus” in mind for each section of each regulatory statute. The Court could
have dealt with its stated concern, avoiding conflict with other sovereigns,
in far more transparent ways than by requiring that Morrison’s concept of a
“regulatory focus” be atomized across every section and subsection of every
statute.
B. The Single Focus
A second formalism is traceable to the U.S. Supreme Court, though not
144

RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016).
Id. at 2108 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985)); id. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495).
146
The issue of the “focus” of RICO’s private right of action provision was not initially raised in
the RJR Nabisco case at all. Rather, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals held that they
had to consider the focus of the private right of action provision in the Commodities Exchange Act. See
Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Loginovskaya argues that Morrison
governs substantive (conduct-regulating) provisions rather than procedural provisions such as § 22.
Morrison, however, draws no such distinction . . . . (Jacobs, J.)), Id. at 277 (“In my view, Kiobel, on
which the majority relies, actually endorses the distinction between ‘substantive provisions and those
that only create a cause of action,’ Majority Op. at 272, and underscores that the presumption applies
only to the former.” (Lohier, J., dissenting)). The United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
denied the petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, with Judge Hall, a member of the original
panel, concurring to address the argument from Loginovskaya. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 783 F.3d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 2015).
147
Id. at 2107 n.9 (2016). At argument, Justice Breyer questioned whether the European
Community had sufficiently consulted with its member states before instituting the suit. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 31, RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (No. 15-138).
145
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directly attributable to it. Lower courts seem to have assumed that each
statute (or perhaps each section of each statute) can only have a single
regulatory focus. The Morrison majority did not state that each statute (or
each section of a statute, after RJR Nabisco) must have a “singular” focus,
but “apparently assumed that there can be only one.”148 Perhaps the
“singular” focus requirement was an unstated assumption—but perhaps not.
Perhaps Morrison was merely an example of one application of one statute
in which there happened to be only one focus. After all, Justice Scalia’s
opinion referred to the “objects”—plural—of the statute’s solicitude.149
The rhetoric used and sources cited by the Morrison majority suggest as
much. Morrison emphasized repeatedly the importance of international
comity—a theme similarly emphasized by Professors Silberman and Choi
in their article cited prominently by the Court.150 Silberman and Choi make
two points, one grounded in conflict of laws and the other in substantive
securities law. First, they argue that, for purposes of balancing concerns of
comity, the exchange is the appropriate focus of the Act.151 Second, they
argue that, to achieve the appropriate level of securities fraud deterrence, the
exchange is the appropriate regulatory target.152 Their argument is expressly
tailored to the question of equity securities traded on a public exchange and
do not suggest that a “singular” focus is a trans-substantive153 requirement
of the domestic application inquiry.154 Seen in this light, the long-standing
and continuing fight over whether RICO regulates a racketeering enterprise
or a pattern of racketeering activity seems foolish. RICO regulates both—
the notion that Congress envisioned only one regulatory focus is a legal
fiction that serves no obvious aim.155
148

Pamela Bookman, Microsoft Ireland: Extraterritoriality Step Zero, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 16,
2018), http://www.justsecurity.org/52478/extraterritoriality-step/ (accessed Mar. 15, 2018) (Highlander
reference in original).
149
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010) (emphasis added).
150
Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation & Global Securities ClassAction Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465 (2009).
151
See id. at 501 (“[A]n exchange-based rule gives courts a simple rule of thumb to follow.”).
152
See id. at 497 (“Another divergence between the private deterrence incentives under an
exchange-based rule lies with the expense of litigation.”).
153
It may be a bad idea in general to imply trans-substantive doctrines where they are not expressly
required. See generally Aaron Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 325
(2018).
154
The language of the Act itself, as interpreted in Morrison, also supports such a conclusion. As
the Morrison majority observes, the Act regulates only fraud and the resulting injuries “in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In other words, the fraudulent conduct and its effects would be wholly behind the reach of the
statute but for the purchase and sale of securities. Therefore, in this particular statute, it may well have
made sense to select the singular focus of the exchange.
155
See Aaron D. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 259, 269–70 (2015)
(examining Lon Fuller’s critique of legal fictions, including the distinction between a presumption, which
is rebuttable, and a fiction, which is not).
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C. The Sufficient Focus
Two further formalisms flowed from Morrison—though these have
already been questioned by the lower courts grappling with Morrison’s
aftermath. Morrison announced a “transactional test” for the Act—but, as
discussed above, it is unlikely that the Morrison majority intended to
institute a transactional test for every statute (if the Morrison majority even
envisioned that the Morrison presumption would apply to every statute).156
However, the lower courts read two additional formalisms into the Court’s
emphasis on the “transaction test.” The lower courts initially interpreted
Morrison to require a concrete, localizable focus. (Though, as discussed
above, it is questionable whether many “transactions” can, in fact, be so
localized.) The lower courts also initially interpreted the focus test to be the
end of the domestic application inquiry—the determination of whether the
“object of the statute’s solicitude” was within or without the United States
was deemed sufficient to end the domestic application inquiry.157 Both of
these formalisms have come under question in the subsequent cases.
In Absolute Activist Master Fund v. Ficeto, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the Morrison test developed for
publicly traded equities to off-exchange securities transactions.158 The court
was already supplied (or saddled) with Morrison’s holding that the focus of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the “transaction.” In Morrison, this
equated easily to the place of the exchange. In Absolute Activist Master
Fund, the Second Circuit held that the transaction took place where
“irrevocable liability was incurred or title was transferred.”159 But the court
expressly rejected the argument that any contacts beyond the presence of the
transaction were needed to ground a “domestic application” of the statute.160
Simply put, the “transactional test announced in Morrison does not require”
conduct in the United States.161
The court retreated from this simple rule less than two years later. In
Parkcentral v. Porche, the transactions were plainly domestic: swap
156

See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267 (“The Court [in Morrison] held that ‘it is in our view only
transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to
which § 10(b) applies.’”); supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
157
See, e.g., Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2012)
(rejecting the argument that “it is still necessary to determine whether each individual defendant engaged
in at least some conduct in the United States,” because “the transactional test announced in Morrison
does not require that each defendant alleged to be involved in a fraudulent scheme engage in conduct in
the United States.”).
158
Id. at 66–67.
159
Id. at 68–69 (“Accordingly, rather than looking to the identity of the parties, the type of security
at issue, or whether each individual defendant engaged in conduct within the United States, we hold that
a securities transaction is domestic when the parties incur irrevocable liability to carry out the transaction
within the United States or when title is passed within the United States.”).
160
Id. at 68.
161
Id. at 69.
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contracts in which every contact but the reference security was in the United
States.162 The reference security was Volkswagen stock.163 (No party to the
transaction actually held Volkswagen stock, making this a purely
“synthetic” swap.)164 The defendant, Porsche, had fraudulently
misrepresented that it had no intentions to acquire Volkswagen.165 In fact,
Porsche was planning a takeover of Volkswagen.166 When these plans got
out, Volkswagen momentarily became the most valuable company in the
world.167 The swap counter-party betting the Volkswagen’s stock price
would fall sued Porsche in U.S. court under U.S. securities law.168 After all,
the transaction was clearly domestic.169
The court declined to apply U.S. securities law.170 The court added an
important qualification to Absolute Activist (and by extension, to Morrison
itself): “[W]hile a domestic transaction or listing is necessary to state a claim
under § 10(b), a finding that these transactions were domestic would not
suffice to compel the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ invocation of § 10(b) was
appropriately domestic.”171 Neither the Second Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme
Court had considered the situation of a pure-third party to a domestic
transaction who commits a fraud that is nevertheless “in connection with”
that transaction.172 In that instance, the appeals court held that something
additional—some conduct—was required.173 The Morrison decision derided
162
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit notes that the “plaintiffs have, to
varying degrees, alleged that they entered into the swap agreements referencing VW shares in the United
States,” including allegations that they “took all steps necessary to transact the securities-based swap
agreements from their offices in New York City”; they “signed a confirmation required by [the] . . . swap
counterparty in New York City”; their “swap transactions were entered into, terminated, and based
entirely in the United States, with Deutsche Bank in New York acting as the counterparty”; their swap
agreements were “entered into with New York-based Morgan Stanley in the United States”; their
“counterparties were acting on behalf of financial institutions located in New York”; and their “swap
agreements contained New York choice-of-law provisions and forum selection clauses designating New
York federal and state courts as the forum in which legal disputes would be heard.” Parkcentral Glob.
Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 2014). The court’s recitation
demonstrated, among other things, that there is no agreement among very sophisticated hedge funds as
to what defines a “domestic” U.S. swap contract.
163
Id. at 201.
164
Id. at 205.
165
Id. at 201.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 205.
168
Id. at 201.
169
Id. at 207 (“[T]he securities-based swap agreements in this case [were] concluded domestically
. . . .”).
170
Id. at 216.
171
Id.
172
See id. at 217 (explaining that this situation is a “case of first impression”).
173
See id. at 215–16 (explaining that “treating the location of a transaction as the definitive factor
in the extraterritoriality inquiry[]” is a “problem” and holding that “a finding that these transactions were
domestic would not suffice to compel the conclusion that . . . invocation of § 10(b) was appropriately
domestic.”).
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the combination of conduct and effects as too uncertain a rubric to evaluate
extraterritoriality.174 Now, conduct was being combined with the
metaphysical location of off-exchange transactions to ground precisely the
same analysis—whether U.S. law should govern a dispute with both
domestic and foreign connections.175
In Parkcentral, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit unintentionally made a profound statement on the folly of attempting
to reduce such a complex question to the location of transaction. The court
noted that the “conclusion we have reached on these facts cannot, of course,
be perfunctorily applied to other cases based on the perceived similarity of
a few facts.”176 The court observed that, “[i]n a world of easy and rapid
transnational communication and financial innovation, transactions in novel
financial instruments – which market participants can freely invent to serve
the market’s needs of the moment – can come in innumerable forms of which
we are unaware and which we cannot possibly foresee.”177 Morrison’s
promise of a simple, predictable, rules-based approach to extraterritorial
application of securities law (let alone all laws) seemed to be slipping away.
Indeed, the court stated that “[w]e do not purport to proffer a test that will
reliably determine when a particular invocation of § 10(b) will be deemed
appropriately domestic or impermissibly extraterritorial.”178 Other courts
have agreed that the court failed to proffer a generally applicable test, and
declined to apply what they characterize as Parkcentral’s “predominantly
foreign” test.179
The current draft Restatement (Fourth) of U.S. Foreign Relations law
recognizes this erosion of Morrison’s promised simplicity. The new draft
Restatement largely attempts to inter any case-by-case balancing of
sovereign interests as inconsistent with recent U.S. Supreme case law. But
in light of cases like Parkcentral, the Restatement acknowledges that
“application of the presumption does not preclude U.S. courts from
interpreting a statute to include other comity limitations if doing so is
consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the provision.”180 The
Restatement is ecumenical as to the form of these additional comity
174

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 259–61 (2010).
AARON D. SIMOWITZ, RJR NABISCO V. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE REACH OF U.S. LAW,
YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOLUME 17 (2016/2017), pp. 217–231, 226 (“There
seemed to be a role for conduct, after all.”).
176
Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 217.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
See, e.g., Vancouver Alumni Asset Holdings Inc. v. Daimler AG, No. CV 16-02942 SJO (KSx),
2017 WL 2378369, at *11 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2017) (stating that “[d]efendants’ reliance on Parkcentral
is misplaced—not just because the ‘predominantly foreign’ test is non-binding on this Court” but because
the facts of Parkcentral are distinguishable).
180
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 405 cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 2018).
175
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limitations, noting that “U.S. courts have construed statutory provisions to
include a variety of other comity limitations depending on the text, history,
and purpose of the particular provision.”181 This is a welcome
acknowledgement of the irreducible complexity of the extraterritoriality
analysis—but it also a statement that the Morrison test is neither complete
nor sufficient to determine issue of extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
D. The Localizable Focus
The last formalism is the legal fiction that all “objects” are reducible a
physical location in space—that they are localizable. This is plainly false.182
Courts have made a similar error with regard to intangible assets and
personal jurisdiction, where the attempt “to imagine the situs of an asset with
no actual situs is a logical error with predictably confusing and arbitrary
results.”183 The legal fiction of situs should be discarded for personal
jurisdiction.184 Unfortunately, the very nature of Morrison’s “focus test”
may prevent courts from doing so for extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
But not so for Congress. Morrison is a default rule of statutory
interpretation for federal statutes—it is not more than that. Congress can
displace it with legislation.185 Indeed, Congress has recently done so with
passage of the CLOUD Act as part of the March 23, 2018 omnibus spending
bill.186 The CLOUD Act would replace the courts’ approach in Microsoft—
which turned on divining a situs for the “right of privacy”187—with a conflict
of laws approach grounded in balancing the interests of multiple
sovereigns.188 This is welcome change—though how the U.S. Supreme
Court will respond is yet to be seen.
However, this problem will persist in other areas, absent further
Congressional action. Courts are in a difficult position. Courts may choose
181
Id. § 405 cmt. d. Nonetheless, the Restatement forcefully asserts a vision of this comity analysis
that takes place wholesale—at the statutory interpretation level rather than the retail level—in each
particular case. See id. § 405 cmt. a (“Reasonableness is a principle of statutory interpretation and not a
discretionary judicial authority to decline to apply federal law. It operates in conjunction with other
principles of statutory interpretation. When the intent of Congress to apply a particular provision is clear,
a U.S. court must apply that provision even if doing so would interfere with the sovereign authority of
other states.”).
182
See Simowitz, supra note 155, at 259 (“Debts, shares of stock, intellectual property, wire
transfers, LLC interests, and all other intangible assets have no physical location.”).
183
Id. at 292.
184
Id. (“Once the situs fiction is discarded, the problem of where an enforcing court can exert power
over an intangible asset can be viewed anew through the lens of conflict of laws principles.”).
185
Id. at 261 (“Congress introduced the concept of intangible situs into the law of tax as a deliberate
legal fiction to address a particular problem.”).
186
Woods & Swire, supra note 135.
187
See supra notes 120–133 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s holding in Microsoft
focusing on the “invasion of privacy” and locating the invasion in Ireland).
188
See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text (explaining that the CLOUD Act mooted
Microsoft and describing the Act’s balancing test).
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a “regulatory focus” that is intangible and not subject to easy localization,
such as the “right to privacy.” But this carries risks. The entire question of
whether U.S. law will apply—often a question that will determine the
outcome—will depend on seemingly arbitrary or irrelevant facts. For
example, in Microsoft, it was far from clear why Microsoft’s decision on
where to locate its servers should control whether U.S. law applies. It is not
even clear that the location of the servers had any necessary connection to
the location of the user’s “right to privacy.” After all, they are Microsoft’s
servers and it is not Microsoft’s “right to privacy” at issue. (Although
Microsoft could face serious concerns if were caught in the vise of foreign
compulsion.) Nor is at all clear why the larger question of which sovereign’s
law should apply should turn on server location. Before passage of the
CLOUD Act, the question of whether the relevant data would be disclosed
under U.S. law—and likely disclosed at all—turned on just these sorts of
arbitrary and irrelevant factors.189
On the other hand, if courts choose a regulatory focus that is readily
localizable, but readily moveable, the application of U.S. law may turn
entirely on decisions by private parties. In other words, Microsoft could
effectively opt out of U.S. discovery and data protection law by locating its
servers in Ireland. The Madoff operation (or future fraudulent enterprises)
could easily opt out of U.S. fraudulent conveyance law by forming a foreign
feeder fund. As the U.S. Supreme Court itself observed in RJR Nabisco,
racketeers could easily move their enterprise abroad (particularly under the
“nerve center” test that some lower courts had imported from the diversity
jurisdiction context).190 Counterparties to off-exchange securities
transactions could easily opt out of U.S. securities law by moving their
transactions abroad.
This danger can arise when a court selects a concrete, localizable focus
or even when a court selects a diffuse, intangible regulatory focus.191 As the
Microsoft case illustrates, a diffuse focus (the right to privacy) can quickly
become yoked to a tangible and moveable on-the-ground object (the Dublin

189
See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 326 (2015) ( “[D]ata
undermines longstanding assumptions about the link between data location and the rights and obligations
that should apply.”). Daskal argues that server location has no “normative significance” to a user of
electronic communications. This may be true to the average natural person—probably including the John
Doe at issue in the Microsoft case. But it matters very much to the third-party e-mail providers—like
Microsoft—that choose where to locate their server facilities. Whether that should matter in the analysis
is a different question.
190
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2104 (2016).
191
The current draft Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law attempts to deal with some of
this confusion by identifying a category of “non-geographic” focuses. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 404 Reporters’ Note 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“If a court
concludes that the focus of a provision is non-geographic, then it would apply equally in foreign and
domestic cases and no clear indication of extraterritoriality would be required.”).
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servers). It may not always be obvious when the choice of a concrete focus
or a concrete situs for an intangible focus will raise this concern. For
example, corporate nationality is easily manipulable in many contexts.193
Under the rule adopted by the Madoff district court,194 a U.S. transaction
could be transformed into a Cayman Islands transaction merely by
incorporating a Cayman special purpose entity as an intermediary. For the
average hedge fund, that is practically costless. The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) encountered this exact problem in attempting
to promulgate regulations governing extraterritorial regulation of swap
transaction.195 The CFTC settled on a rule requiring the registration under
Dodd-Frank if the swap was guaranteed by a U.S. party (recognizing that
limited the statute’s reach to U.S. counterparties would fail to adequately
protect U.S. economic interests).196 The CFTC quickly found that the same
swaps suddenly had foreign guarantors—in turn guaranteed by U.S.
entities.197
IV. A NEW FOCUS
Morrison could have been interpreted very differently. The sources cited
in Justice Scalia’s majority suggest that commentators and perhaps the Court
itself were trying to craft a predictable, simple rule for exchange traded
securities cases—and perhaps not more than that.198 Viewed in that light,
Morrison is not especially troubling. It could have been viewed as a
specification of the broader “reasonableness” principles in this one area. It
may not be possible to frame a more precise than “reasonableness” for all
192
See Matter of Warrant Search Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 220 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated as moot sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138
S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2018) (per curiam) (holding that the invasion of privacy took place at the Microsoft
servers in Dublin).
193
William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2019) (“[R]ecent U.S.
Supreme Court cases restricting the geographic scope of federal statutes create a space for commercial
actors to circumvent regulation by incorporating in offshore jurisdictions.”).
194
Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 513 B.R. 222, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
195
See William Morici, SIFMA v. CFTC: Derivative Swap Regulations Gain Extraterritorial
Traction, CORNELL INT’L. L. REV. ONLINE (Nov. 20, 2014), http://cornellilj.org/sifma-v-cftc-derivativeswap-regulations-gain-extraterritorial-traction/; John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial
Regulation: Why E.T. Can't Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1274 (2014) (“Because OTC
derivatives are not traded on exchanges, they do not have any clear-cut geographic location. Swap
transactions can be between participants in two different countries, booked in a third country, and riskmanaged in a fourth country.”).
196
Morici, supra note 195.
197
See Coffee, supra note 195, at 1274 (“[S]wap transactions do not need to be based in the United
States and could easily be moved offshore—if such a migration would allow the swap dealer to escape
regulation. Thus, the incentive to engage in regulatory arbitrage is uniquely high, and an angry Congress
decided in the Dodd-Frank Act to respond by deeming U.S. law to apply if a U.S. entity was involved.”).
198
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austrl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 260 (2010) (“Commentators have criticized
the unpredictable and inconsistent application of § 10(b) to transnational cases.” (citations omitted)).
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cases of extraterritoriality—but surely the test could be more precisely
defined in a particular area of law.
But that is not what happened. The lower courts expressed reluctance to
apply Morrison to other statutes.199 The U.S. Supreme Court did not.
Kiobel200 and RJR Nabisco201 seemed to lay down the principle that the
Morrison test would apply to all statutes—though the Court may yet retreat
from that position.202 And so Morrison, steps one and two, are here to stay.
A more rational, sensible, and yes, predictable, approach is required. Future
courts can help to ameliorate some of the uncertainties inherent in the “focus
test” by hewing to a few principles.
A. Apply prescriptive comity
Courts should recognize that the so-called “focus test” is a
fundamentally transnational inquiry. It makes little sense to identify “the
objects of the statute’s solicitude” without considering the context of the
question. Indeed, the sources relied on by the Morrison Court suggest as
much.203 A transnational approach to the focus test strongly suggest that
courts should look to the principles of prescriptive comity to guide the
inquiry.
The new Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law moves the
principle of “prescriptive comity” to the center of statutory interpretation
and extraterritorial application. The Restatement describes the “principle of
‘prescriptive comity’” as “a principle of statutory interpretation and not a
discretionary judicial authority to decline to apply federal law.”204
Prescriptive comity “does not seek to avoid all interference with the
sovereign authority of other states, but rather to avoid unreasonable
199
See, e.g., United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In addition, although
we find the available evidence here sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality,
there is reason to doubt that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to § 2423(b) at all.”).
200
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013) (applying the Morrison test to
the Alien Tort Statute).
201
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016) (applying the Morrison test
to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act).
202
In its most recent decision applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court
declined to consider whether the presumption applied to remedial provisions, instead turning first to the
focus test. See WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129 at 2136.
203
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 260 (2010) (“Commentators have criticized the unpredictable and
inconsistent application of § 10(b) to transnational cases.” (citing Choi & Silberman, Transnational
Litigation and Global Securities Class–Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS . L. REV. 465, 467–468; Chang,
Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of
Extraterritorial Subject–Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORD. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 106–108, 115–116 (2004);
Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized
Securities Marketplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 244–248 (1992)).
204
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 405 cmt. a. (AM . LAW
INST. 2018).
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interference with such authority.”
This principle is most clearly embodied in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran.206 In Empagran, the Court
rejected the most plausible textual reading of the statute in favor of a
construction that would be avoid potential conflict with a U.K. regulatory
scheme.207 The Court stated that it “ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes
to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations,” and that “[t]his rule of statutory construction cautions courts to
assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of
other nations when they write American laws.”208 The Court signaled the
strength of the principle of prescriptive comity by acknowledging that
“considerations” of “comity and history” actually motivated it to reject the
statutory reading that “might” be “the more natural reading.”209 The Court
observed that, “[i]f the statute’s language reasonably permits an
interpretation” that avoids unreasonable interference with another
sovereign’s laws, “we should adopt it.”210
Strangely, U.S. courts have almost entirely neglected to invoke this
principle when faced with the question of determining the statute’s focus.
Even the Restatement—which uses “prescriptive comity” as the organizing
principle for the extraterritorial application of U.S. law—declines to mention
the principle in reference to Morrison’s second step. The Restatement
acknowledges that the “Supreme Court has adopted a two-step framework
for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to federal statutory
provisions and causes of action,” and lays out in some detail the parameters
for application of this second step.211 The Restatement observes that
“[d]ifferent federal statutory provisions focus on different things”212—some
on “the proscribed conduct,”213 some on “transactions,”214 and some on

205
Id. (“Interference with the sovereign authority of foreign states may be reasonable if such
application would serve the legitimate interests of the United States.”).
206
542 U.S. 155 (2004).
207
Id. at 174.
208
Id. at 164–65 (“It thereby helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together
in harmony—a harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world.”).
209
Id. at 174 (“At most, respondents’ linguistic arguments might show that respondents’ reading is
the more natural reading of the statutory language. But those arguments do not show that we must accept
that reading. And that is the critical point.”).
210
Id. (“And, for the reasons stated, we believe that the statute’s language permits the reading that
we give it.”).
211
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 404, Reporters’ Note
6 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (citing RJR and Morrison).
212
Id. at n.8.
213
Id. (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007); Pasquantino v. United
States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005)).
214
Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010); EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949)).
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“injury.”
As for the method for determining the statutory focus, the Restatement
observes that the “focus of a provision may be indicated by its text,” or that
“focus of the statute as a whole may also be relevant in determining the focus
of its individual provisions,” or that the “focus of a statutory provision may
also ‘be inferred from the nature of the offense.’”216 The Restatement also
acknowledges that “[s]ometimes, the focus of a federal statutory provision
is non-geographic”217 and that “[i]f a court concludes that the focus of a
provision is non-geographic, then it would apply equally in foreign and
domestic cases and no clear indication of extraterritoriality would be
required.”218
The Restatement’s approach is thus ecumenical and descriptive. It lists
all the various approaches that the Supreme Court and (to a lesser extent)
lower courts have taken in determining the “focus” of a statute.219 But it
suggests no tool or recommended approaches for making that inquiry—or
for choosing among multiple plausible focuses.220 Perhaps the proliferation
of approaches makes any such articulation chancy at best.
But it is striking that “prescriptive comity” is completely absent as an
interpretative principle or tool.221 After all, the second step of Morrison does
the exact same practical work as the first step—determining whether a U.S.
statute will apply to a particular claim or constellation of facts. One may
argue that step-one resolves these questions wholesale, whereas step-two is
more retail. But this both overstates the simplicity of step-one and
understates the impact of step-two.
The Restatement endorses the notion that a court may impose additional
limitations of the reach of a U.S. statute even if the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been rebutted. The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign
Relations Law states that the “application of the presumption does not
preclude U.S. courts from interpreting a statute to include other comity
limitations if doing so is consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the
provision,”222 and that “U.S. courts have construed statutory provisions to
include a variety of other comity limitations depending on the text, history,
215
Id. (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016); F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 796 (1993); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286, 288 (1952)).
216
Id. (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)).
217
Id. at n.10 (citation omitted).
218
Id.
219
See supra notes 211–18 and accompanying text (highlighting sections of the Restatement that
discuss Supreme Court approaches to determining a statute’s focus).
220
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 404 (AM. LAW INST.
2018).
221
Id.
222
Id. § 405 cmt. c.
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and purpose of the particular provision.” Similarly, the resolution of steptwo is not a case-by-case inquiry—rather, it resolves whether an entire class
of claims will be included under the statute’s reach.
Some courts seem to articulate concerns based in prescriptive comity,
although not under that name. In his Madoff opinion, Judge Rakoff
proclaimed that he was engaging in a “straightforward reading” that yielded
a regulatory focus on the ultimate transfer, rather than on the estate.224 At the
outset, Judge Rakoff rejected that Trustee’s argument that the regulatory
focus was on the estate because, on “the level of policy, this approach could
raise serious issues of international comity.”225 However, Judge Rakoff did
not treat comity as a principle of statutory interpretation226—as the
Restatement and Empagram suggest—but as a free-standing “choice-of-law
analysis to determine whether the application of U.S. law would be
reasonable under the circumstances, comparing the interests of the United
States and the relevant foreign state,” that would apply “even if the
presumption against extraterritoriality were rebutted.”227
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned
the district court on this point as well, but introduced yet another variation
of the comity analysis. In the appellate court’s account, the choice of the
statutory focus drove the subsequent comity analysis. The court was careful
to note that it was engaging in a prescriptive, rather than adjudicative, comity
analysis, but following a prior panel’s decision in In re Maxwell, seemed to
treat the comity analysis as additional separate step to be added at the very
end of the analysis. However, the choice of the initial transfer as the focus,
rather than the ultimate transfer drove the comity analysis: “The lower
courts, erroneously focusing on the subsequent transfer, found that the
jurisdictions adjudicating the feeder funds’ liquidations had a greater interest
in resolving these disputes than the United States. . . . This conclusion rests
on incorrect premises.” The appellate court concluded that, because the
“focus is on regulating and remedying a debtor’s fraudulent transfer of
property . . . [t]he domestic nature of those transfers, and our nation’s
compelling interest in regulating them, tips the scales of In re Maxwell’s
choice-of-law test in favor of domestic adjudication.”228

223

Id. § 204 cmt. d.
Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 513 B.R. 222, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
225
Id.
226
Judge Rakoff’s elision of the two doctrines placed the Trustee in a Catch-22. Sec. Inv’r Prot.
Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. AP 08-01789 (SMB), Adv. No. 11-02760 (SMB), 2016
WL 6900689, at *9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016).
227
Madoff, 513 B.R. 222, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
228
In re Picard, Tr. for Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 917 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2019)
224
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B. Recognize multiple focuses
In its amicus brief in RJR Nabisco v. European Community, the United
States government argued that the RICO statute focused on multiple things:
racketeering enterprises, patterns of racketeering conduct, and the injuries of
those harmed by racketeering activity.229 In a vacuum, this assertion seems
uncontroversial—practically obvious. Of course Congress had been
concerned with stamping out racketeering enterprise, deterring racketeering
conduct, and redressing the harms suffered by victims of that conduct.
And yet, multiple circuit courts had been “deeply divided”230 by the
question of which of these “objects of the statute’s solicitude” was the sole
focus on the RICO statute. The origins of this resistance are not clear—but
the most likely explanation is that lower courts have been extremely wary of
any holdings that would appear to recapitulate the “conduct and effects” test
derided in Morrison. However, this unconditional resistance has distorted
the application of these statutes and does not necessarily reflect the thrust of
the Morrison opinion.
Justice Scalia derided the Second Circuit’s long-standing approach to
the extraterritorial application of § 10(b). In his telling, the Second Circuit
ignored the presumption against extraterritoriality, a principle “long and
often recited in our opinions,” because the lower court “believed that,
because the Exchange Act is silent as to the extraterritorial application of §
10(b), it was left to the court to ‘discern’ whether Congress would have
wanted the statute to apply.”231 He stated that this approach has “produced a
collection of tests for divining what Congress would have wanted, complex
in formulation and unpredictable in application.”232 He argued that the
Second Circuit “had excised the presumption against extraterritoriality from
the jurisprudence of § 10(b) and replaced it with the inquiry whether it would
be reasonable (and hence what Congress would have wanted) to apply the
statute to a given situation.”233 The conduct and effects test “became the
north star of the Second Circuit’s § 10(b) jurisprudence, pointing the way to

229
See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (No. 15-138), 2015 WL 9268185, at *9 (“Contrary to
petitioners’ claim, RICO contains no domestic-enterprise requirement. RICO’s ‘focus’ (Morrison, 561
U.S. at 266) is on the ‘pattern’ as well as the enterprise. Accordingly, if a pattern of domestic racketeering
activity occurs, RICO may be violated whether the enterprise is foreign or domestic.”).
230
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., (2016) (No. 15-138),
2015 WL 4572754, at *11 (“Prior to the panel decision below, the courts had unanimously concluded at
step one of Morrison that RICO ‘does not apply extraterritorially.’ At step two, however, the courts
sharply divided over how to distinguish between domestic and extraterritorial applications.” (citation
omitted)).
231
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
232
Id. at 255–56.
233
Id. at 257.
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what Congress would have wished.” Justice Scalia observed that the
“Second Circuit never put forward a textual or even extratextual basis for
these tests.”235
Justice Scalia devoted a paragraph each to his critiques that the the
conduct and effects test was difficult administer and non-uniform. He then
returned to his principal theme—quoting Judge Bork—“that rather than
courts’ divining what Congress would have wished if it had addressed the
problem,” a “more natural inquiry might be what jurisdiction Congress in
fact thought about and conferred.”236 In turning to commentary, Justice
Scalia noted the perceived violence that the conduct and effects test did to
proper textual interpretation.237
To the extent that Justice Scalia did focus on administration of the
test—rather than its extra-textual origins—his comments do not suggest an
absolute aversion to focusing on conduct and effects, as such. Rather, the
test as applied by the lower courts improperly “resolv[ed] matter of
policy.”238
C. Vindicate statutory purpose
The Court examined only in dicta RJR Nabisco’s argument that the
racketeering “enterprise” was the focus of RICO.239 The Court noted that an
“enterprise” is difficult to locate and that if more definite tests are used to do
234

Id. at 257–58.
See id. at 258 (noting language from the appellate court that “if we were asked to point to
language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we would
be unable to respond” (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975)).
236
See id. at 260 (noting that Judge Bork had deferred to the Second Circuit approach in light of its
“preeminence” in the field of securities law (Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co. 824 F.2d, 27, 32 (1987))).
237
See id. (“Some have challenged the premise underlying the Courts of Appeals’ approach, namely
that Congress did not consider the extraterritorial application of § 10(b) (thereby leaving it open to the
courts, supposedly, to determine what Congress would have wanted.”) (citing Margaret V. Sachs, The
International Reach of Rule 10b–5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
677 (1990)); id. at 260–61 (“Others, more fundamentally, have noted that using congressional silence as
a justification for judge-made rules violates the traditional principle that silence means no extraterritorial
application.” (citing John D. Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New U.S.
Jurisprudence with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti–Fraud Provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT'L BUS. 477, 492–93 (1997)).
238
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 259 (“While applying the same fundamental methodology of balancing
interests and arriving at what seemed the best policy, they produced a proliferation of vaguely related
variations on the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ tests.”). The sources relied on by the Court also give greater
context to the Court’s concern. Professors Silberman and Choi’s work was prominently cited in the
Morrison majority. See, e.g., Choi & Silberman, supra note 150 (arguing only that the exchange was the
appropriate point of regulatory concern for publicly traded equities and refusing to argue against a
wholesale rejection of the conducts-and-effects test, even though its issues were recognized).
239
See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2104 (2016). (“It is easy to see why
Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enterprises. A domestic enterprise requirement would lead to
difficult line-drawing problems and counterintuitive results . . . . RJR also offers no satisfactory way of
determining whether an enterprise is foreign or domestic.”).
235
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so, it will render racketeering enterprises easy to relocate. Therefore, the
choice of the enterprise as the “regulatory focus” of RICO would undermine
the very purposes of the statute itself: “It would exclude from RICO’s reach
foreign enterprises—whether corporations, crime rings, other associations,
or individuals—that operate within the United States.”241 Or in the words of
the United States of Appeals for the Second Circuit: “Surely the presumption
against extraterritorial application of United States laws does not command
giving foreigners carte blanche to violate the laws of the United States in the
United States.”242
Much of the criticism of the lower court opinions in the Madoff and
Microsoft disputes followed this theme: If selection of a certain regulatory
focus would permit easy evasion of the regulatory law itself—it should be
rejected. Parties should not be able to evade the United States’s regulatory
apparatus simply by engaging in data localization abroad and by
incorporating a foreign feeder fund. In other words, Morrison analysis
should be conduct with a simple anti-evasion principle in mind. The choice
required of Morrison step-two—the statute’s “regulatory focus”—should
not undermine the regulatory scheme itself. A court’s selection of a “focus”
will dramatically affect how the statute functions in transnational disputes.
The court should therefore select a focus that vindicates, rather than
undermines or defeats, the functioning of the regulatory scheme.
The United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded its
analysis in the Madoff case by invoking this anti-evasion, anti-loophole
principle. The court noted that “[f]actoring the transferee’s receipt of
property into our analysis would not only misread the Bankruptcy Code’s
avoidance and recovery provisions, but also open a loophole.”243 The court
noted that, if a “fraudster transferred the property to a foreign entity that then
transferred it to another foreign entity,” and the Bankruptcy Code could not
reach subsequent foreign transfers, “that transfer would make the property
recovery-proof, even if the subsequent foreign transferee then sent the
property to someone located in the United States.” The court closed its
analysis with the observation: “We cannot imagine how [the Morrison
presumption] should guide us to read the Bankruptcy Code’s creditorprotection provisions in this self-defeating way.”244
CONCLUSION
Congress has developed a bit of a habit of reversing the courts on issues of
240

Id.
Id.
242
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 764 F.3d 129, 138 (2nd Cir. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2090
(2016).
243
In re Picard, Tr. for Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 17-2992(L), 2019 WL
903978, at *9 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2019).
244
Id.
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extraterritoriality. Congress reversed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Aramco, amending to Title VII to apply to U.S. citizens applied by U.S. entities
abroad. Congress reversed the Court’s decision in Morrison, at least with regard
to government actions, explicitly restoring the conduct-and-effects test. Most
recently, Congress reversed the United State Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit’s decision in the Microsoft litigation, setting by legislation the rule the
location of the data is irrelevant to the analysis of whether the date will be
disclosed.
The problem is not simply that the Morrison test is flawed. The problem is
that, in some instances, any choice will be wrong. In the Microsoft litigation, the
court was faced with a choice of everything or nothing. Either every bit of data
accessible in the United States would be disclosable subject to U.S. law—or
every bit of data localized abroad would be shielded from it. That sort of in-orout choice is in the very nature of the “focus test.” And that decision will not turn
on the competing interests of sovereigns—but rather of seemingly arbitrary or
irrelevant facts such as the location of computer terminals or servers.
The Morrison test seems here to stay. But it can be improved with the
excision of some of the formalisms that have accumulated since Morrison
was decided. This article seeks both to scrape off those barnacles and to set
a few guiding principles for a less troubled path forward.

